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Abstract
An adversarial game is used to model the amount of inuence a rm has over
a government regulator, and its equilibrium level of regulation, as a function of rm
fundamentals. The eective inuence of a rm is identied as comprising both intrinsic
and exerted components; where the latter involves distorting regulation via a transfer
to the regulator. Understanding the source of a rm's high inuence is found to be
important for | among other things | predicting whether it faces higher or lower
regulatory constraint than other rms. Data from the World Business Environment
Survey provides strong evidence in support of model hypotheses across a wide range of
government agents, countries, and regulatory areas. Of particular relevance to public
debate, large rms are found to be more likely to be inuential, but also more likely
to experience regulatory constraint than smaller rms.
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\The scope, the extent, the insidious nature of corporate inuence in regulatory
agencies of government - this question of regulatory capture - is something we
should attend to here. It is the lesson. And it raises the question, beyond the
Minerals Management Service, how far does this corporate inuence reach into
our agencies of government?" Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-Rhode Island),
June 17, 2010.
Are corporations able to use carrots such as campaign contributions to wriggle their
way out of regulatory constraints? Public opinion, mirrored in the comments of Senator
Whitehouse, certainly suggests politically active rms are able to buy their way out of
environmental regulations and other forms of scrutiny. But at the same time, many of
the same rms complain they are subject to intense interference by regulators. Is this
just political posturing? Or are these two world views compatible? Might some rms be
simultaneously more inuential and subject to more regulatory constraint?
It is well understood in the literature as well as in public debate that political inuence
is a means for interest groups and rms to achieve an ends. In the case of rms, the
desired end is a more protable operating environment - not necessarily a socially optimal
outcome. For this reason there is an extensive political science literature which examines both
the determinants of rm attempts to achieve inuence - notably contributions to political
action committees (PAC) in the US - and the impacts of these transfers - notably on US
congressional voting patterns. The latter literature, while extensive, remains inconclusive
and conventional wisdom is that there is little eect of rms' PAC contributions on voting
behavior when models are well specied (Hall and Wayman 1990, Potters and Sloof 1996,
Wawro 2001, Roscoe and Jenkins 2005).
Recently there has been a number of studies which ask similar questions about the de-
terminants and impacts of inuence for a range of countries (Hellman et al. 2003, Chong
and Gradstein 2007, Campos and Giovannoni 2007, Desbordes and Vauday 2007, Desai and
Olofsgard 2008). This growth in the literature has been facilitated by the World Bank's
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Surveys (BEEPs) which ask managers of rms in a wide range of countries
about their relationship with the national government, including how much inuence the
rms have over rules, laws, regulations and decrees of importance to the rm's operations.
2In order to understand the sources and consequences of rm inuence, we distinguish
between two types. Firstly, a rm may be inuential if the government sees eye to eye,
or has overlapping interests with, the rm. Firms may have such intrinsic inuence for a
number of reasons including perceived positive spillovers, government shareholdings and - as
shown by Faccio (2006) - personal connections. A rm may also be inuential if the regulator
and rm disagree on the principles but the rm is able to divert the regulator from her ideal
though some form of transfer. This exerted inuence is the focus of the political science
literature on PAC contributions and (often implicitly) the political economy of regulation
literature following Stigler (1971). The challenge for the empirical literature using either PAC
contributions or survey-based measures of inuence, is that exerted inuence is endogenous.
We illustrate the endogeneity of inuence by building a simple model of a single rm that
makes a binding take-it-or-leave it oer to the regulator.1 The oer consists of a transfer
from the rm to the government and a level of regulatory constraint to be imposed on the
rm. The regulator accepts the oer only so long as its welfare is at least as high as it would
be if it rejected the oer, forwent the transfer, and imposed its threatpoint, regulation on
the rm. As is standard in the political economy of regulation literature we assume the
government puts more weight on the transfer received than it does on the rm's cost of
making the transfer (Stigler 1971, Grossman and Helpman 1994, Besley and Coate 2001).
In our model there may also be frictions in transferring rents to the regulator.
Exerted inuence in our model is close to Becker (1983), who dened a group's inuence as
the deadweight costs to society of the subsidy the rm receives; Becker assumed the inuence
exerted by a group depends on endogenous variables, including a group's expenditures on
achieving its political objectives. We dene a rm's exerted inuence as the gap between
the equilibrium regulation and the regulator's threatpoint regulation, where the latter is the
amount of regulatory interference to which the rm would be subjected but for the political
relationship.
The common understanding of political inuence, however, encompasses more than in-
uence exerted through transfers. As noted in a recent U.K. House of Commons Select
Committee Report (2009, p.5):
\The practice of lobbying in order to inuence political decisions is a legiti-
1In order to make our model general, unlike many of the sophisticated political economy models in the
literature we do not restrict the type of government agent. The agent may be she may be a political executive,
member of legislature, part of a ministry or regulatory agency. Thus we use the terms \government",
\regulator", \policy-maker" and \policy-setter" interchangeably throughout.
3mate and necessary part of the democratic process. Individuals and organisations
reasonably want to inuence decisions that may aect them, those around them,
and their environment. Government in turn needs access to the knowledge and
views that lobbying can bring...however..there is a perception that commercial
corporations and organisations have an advantage over not-for-prot bodies, an
advantage which is related to the amount of money they are able to bring to bear
on the political process rather than the cogency of their case."
We integrate the dierent types of inuence|exerted and intrinsic|into a single metric
we call eective inuence, dened as the gap between equilibrium regulation and the regu-
lation which would be chosen if transfers are not allowed and the policy-maker is ignorant
of the impacts of regulation on prots and positive spillovers generated by the rm.
Our model delivers predictions as to how primitive rm characteristics such as size, own-
ership structure and number of competitors aect equilibrium regulation and the dierent
types of inuence. Our model suggests that the relationship between a rm's political inu-
ence and its level of regulatory constraint depends on the source of its inuence. For example,
lowering the number of competitors and increasing rm size will both independently increase
a rm's inuence. However, while lower competition is a source of regulatory slack, larger
size may actually lead to increased regulatory constraint.
We test our theoretical predictions using the WBES data. The richness of the WBES data
allows us to test the robustness of these relationships across a range of regulatory areas, most
notably environmental regulations, health and safety standards, business taxes and trade
and foreign exchange regulations. The inuence data is available for four dierent branches
of government, Executive, Legislature, Ministry, and Regulator. Our model performs well
empirically. Treating stated inuence and regulatory constraint as independent variables in
separate regressions, we nd support for many of the theoretical predictions of our model
and in no case do we nd signicant results contrary to our predictions.
2. Influence and Interference
A rm and a regulatory play a two-stage game. In the rst stage, the rm makes the regulator
a take-it-or-leave-it oer of a transfer, T, to be received by the regulator in exchange for a
level of regulatory stingency, X. Higher values of X denote stricter regulation. The rm's net
rents are R = (X)   gT where  measures unit operating prots with 0 < 0 > 00,  > 0
4is a measure of economic scale, and g   1  0 measures the deadweight loss associated with
transferring one dollar to the regulator. We implicitly assume away interactions between the
rm-regulator relationship modeled and any other rms in the economy.2
The regulator's payo is G(X;T) =  [s(X) + b(X) + nN(X)]   e(X)z() + T [   cg]
where s measures regulation-augmented benets to the Rest of Society (ROS) from rm's
activities; we assume s0 > 0  s00. ROS benets include, for example, tax revenue, avoided
damages from industrial emissions, and reduced worker injuries. N measures regulation-
inhibited benets to ROS, for example positive spillovers such as foreign exchange acquisi-
tion and knowledge generation, with N0 < 0 > N00. b;n;c and  are positive, exogenous
parameters measuring the relative importance of producer surplus3, spillovers, transfer costs
and transfers received. e(X)z() measures the regulator's costs of imposing and enforcing
regulation; we assume e0 > 0 < e00 while z0 > 0 > z00. By assuming 0 > z00, we allow for
economies of scale in regulation. We assume throughout that    cg > 0. In the interest of
brevity, we also assume s00, 00, N00 and e00 are each constants.
2.1 Stage 2
We solve the model in reverse. If the regulator rejects the rm's oer, she receives no transfer













G)z() = 0 (1)
with associated second order condition




00z() < 0: (2)
2We focus on the relationship between a single rm and a single regulator, assuming along the way that
this relationship is unaected by the presence of other rms or lobbyists in the economy. This is equivalent
to Grossman and Helpman (1994) in which there lobby groups are \functionally specialized" (Aidt 1998)
and each rm forms its own lobby. Abstracting from political competition, our model deviates from the
previous literature; however we do not think it is unreasonable in the context of actions by individual rms.
Individual rms are likely to achieve their inuence through targeted pressure on individual or small groups
of government actors. Furthermore, the types of regulatory changes they aim to achieve are more likely to
be low visibility ones such as lax enforcement of regulations or the insertion of a benecial loophole in a
regulation under development. These sorts of actions are specically designed not to be observed by other
political actors.
3If we adopt a Utilitarian welfare function, then b < 1 corresponds to the regulator discounting the rm's
compliance costs|a form of scal illusion. If instead the government puts excess weight on the rm's rents,
such as when the rm and regulator have personal connections, we would expect b > 1.
5We will refer to XG as the Regulator's threatpoint regulation, and G(XG;0) as her threatpoint
welfare.4
Suppose the rm oers the regulator the following pair: fT ;Xg; the regulator will
accept the oer if and only if [   cg]T   G(XG;0)   G(X;0) where G(X;0) measures
the Regulator's welfare with stringency X but no transfers; we call this the Regulator's
uncompensated welfare. Because transfers are costly, we can write the Regulator's partici-









s(XG) + b(XG) + nN(XG)

  e(XG)z()   f [s(X) + b(X) + nN(X)]   e(X)z()g
   cg
: (3)
In words, the rm must oer the regulator a transfer proportionate to the gap between her
uncompensated welfare under threatpoint and proposed stringency.
Below we'll make use of the following derivative: dierentiating (3) yields
dT 
dX =  




At the rst stage the rm chooses fT ;Xg so as to maximize R subject to the Regulator's




g [s0(X) + b0(X) + nN0(X)   e0(X)z()]
   cg
= 0 (5)






Equations (1), (3) and (5) jointly dene equilibrium regulation and transfers, X and T ,
as well as threatpoint regulation XG. We devote the next section to analyzing how these
equilibrium values vary with the characteristics of the rm.
4We assume that R(XG)  0 such that the rm's participation constraint is never binding.
63. Co-Determinants of Regulation and Influence
One of our central questions is whether inuence and regulation are negatively correlated. If
we only look at the Regulator's participation constraint, then we would expect a rm must
transfer more resources to regulators in order to achieve commensurately laxer regulation.
But the size of the transfer is endogenous. Moreover, transfers are a means to inuence, not
a measure of inuence achieved.
We identify two alternate metrics of inuence. The rst metric, XG   X, measures
inuence exerted: how far is the rm able to divert stringency away from the level that
would occur but for the lobbying process?
While some rms must rely on transfers in order to induce favourable policy, others
enjoy lenient threatpoint regulation because the rm and regulator already see eye-to-eye.
Although these intrinsically inuential rms may oer transfers to the regualtor nonetheless,
the full extent of their inuence will not be captured by our metric of exerted inuence. We
therefore dene a metric of eective inuence: X0   X, where X0 maximizes G0(X) 
s(X)   e(X)z(); X0 is the stringency that would be chosen by a regulator who receives
no transfers and has a narrow mandate, i.e. a regulator that weighs the direct costs and
benets of regulation|enforcement costs versus reduced pollution damages|but ignores





0)z() = 0; (7)
with associated second order condition for an interior optimum 0 < d2G0
dX2 = 1 b00 nN00 
3:
3.1 Size
In the rhetoric regarding lobbying and regulation, many commentators implicitly suggest that
big rms wield more inuence.5 Size is captured in our framework by , which measures the
scale of activity associated with a given rm. Dierentiating the system formed by (1), (3),
5Public debate also focuses on regulator corruptibility, which depends on state and country-level charac-
teristics. Our model's predictions regarding regulator corruptibility are standard: we nd regulation will be
weaker in countries with more corruptible regulators, and that rms will report greater exerted and eective
















  z0()  0; the weak concavity of z ensures F is non-negative.6 F measures
economies of scale in regulation. If, as the number of units (of economic activity) regulated
rises, the cost of imposing/enforcing regulation on a unit of activity declines, this will reduce
the marginal cost of regulatory stringency, inducing stricter threatpoint regulation. The
strength of regulatory scale economies likely varies across types of regulation. For example,
with environmental, health, and safety regulations, there are non-convexities in the labor-
requirements for onsite inspections. Similar non-convexities occur in assembling teams for
prosecuting violators judicially. In the case of environmental regulations, there may also be
non-convexities in detecting illegal dumping, as detection probabilities increase with the size
and frequency of disposals. Thus it is common for environmental reporting and compliance
requirements |including Toxic Release Inventory and Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements|to have threshold outputs below which rms are exempt.







As  rises, the marginal cost of regulatory stringency declines, and equilibrium regulation
becomes more stringent.




g1[e0(X)   e0(XG)]   00[   cg]e0(XG)
12[   cg]
> 0: (10)
Because e0(XG) e0(X)  0 by the weak convexity of e,
d[XG X]
d is unambiguously positive:
the regulatory gap grows along with the scale of economic activity. Similarly, our measure



























8Combined, (9), (10) and (11) have straightforward empirical implications: provided there
are some economies of scale in regulation, larger rms will exert more inuence (and be
more inuential overall) yet face stricter regulation nonetheless. This prediction directly
contradicts presumptions that regulation and inuence are negatively correlated. In the
case of size, at least, we see that the same forces that widen the gap between the regulator's
ideal and actual stringency|namely, scale economies in regulation|also increase equilibrium
regulation.
Even though stringency and inuence are unambiguously increasing in , we cannot
say whether the equilibrium transfer grows more or less than proportionately with size.

















As per the rst term on the right hand side, an increase in  has a simple scale eect: if
the sector gets twice as large, so too does the gap between ROS and producer surplus when
regulation is unfettered versus inuenced. Accordingly, the transfer required for the Regu-
lator to participate in the political relationship must double as well, other things|namely
regulatory stringency|equal. The rise in  also means that the cost savings arising from lax
regulation|measured by [e(XG)   e(X)]z()|decline. These cost-savings are capitalized
into the transfer, and so a reduction in these cost-savings argues in favor of a larger transfer.
Finally, equilibrium regulation is now more stringent, shrinking the regulatory distortion and
arguing in favor of a smaller transfer. Which dominates|increased scale, reduced cost sav-
ings, or diminished regulatory distortion|is ambiguous. If regulatory economies are small
(i.e. if F is close to zero) then the transfer rises approximately proportionately with scale.
If regulatory economies are instead large, T  may rise more or less than proportionately
with , depending on whether the reduced cost savings dominate the diminished regulatory
distortion.
The ambiguity concerning changes in the equilibrium transfer is not exclusive to changes
in rm size; the sign of dT  is ambiguous for all comparative statics we conduct in the sections
to follow. Moreover, because we focus on inuence achieved, not the means to inuence,|
and because we do not have data measuring transfers|we do not report comparative static
results concerning T  from this point onward.
93.2 Franchise
The parameter b reects the weights the regulator places on the rm's rents, and so an
increase in b reects an increase in the rm's franchise. Dierentiating the system formed






























conrming that threatpoint and equilibrium stringency, as well as exerted inuence, are all
decreasing in b, while eective inuence is increasing in b. We discuss each result in turn.
A rise in b raises how much the regulator values the rm's compliance costs, reducing
the regulator's aversion to lax regulation regardless of whether transfers are oered. As a
consequence, both threatpoint and equilibrium stringency decline with b. In contrast, by
construction the preferred stringency of an indierent regulator is unaected by changes in
b and so dX0=db = 0.
A rise in b pushes exerted and eective inuence in opposite directions. b measures the
rm's intrinsic inuence, i.e. the extent to which the rm's rents are internalized by the
regulator. As b rises, the rm's and regulator's interests become more closely aligned, and
the gap between each party's ideal regulation contracts. Accordingly, our model predicts
that rms with higher intrinsic inuence will have lower exerted inuence, simply because
rms that are intrinsically inuential do not face stringent threatpoint regulation to begin
with. What happens to inuence overall? As per (13), we nd that a rise in the rm's
intrinsic inuence dominates the reduction in exerted inuence, such that the rms eective
inuence rises with b.7
7Normatively, increasing b also increases the likelihood that equilibrium regulation will we laxer than the
level that maximizes Utilitarian welfare Wu  [s(X)+(X) nN(x)] e(X)z(). Dene Xu  argmaxWu;
it is straightforward to show X > Xu if and only if b > 1   [   cg].
103.3 Lobbying Eciency
The parameter g reects the deadweight loss associated with transferring each dollar's worth
of benets to the regulator. Variation in g can originate from a variety of sources, including
spillovers in the lobbying process. For example, multinational rms that have engaged in
lobbying overseas may be more ecient at transferring rents than are rms without outside
experience. Similarly, marginal lobbying costs may be lower for older, established rms. We
can interpret reductions in g as increases in lobbying eciency. Dierentiating the system



















Lowering g lowers the rm's marginal cost of buying weak regulation8, resulting in lower
equilibrium stingency. In contrast, changes in g have no eect on either XG or X0, since these
are calculated independently of any lobbying relationships. Accordingly, our model predicts
equilibrium stringency is unambiguously decreasing in lobbying eciency while both exerted
and eective inuence are increasing.
3.4 Spillovers
Although the tone of our discussion thus far suggests ROS welfare is increasing in regulatory
stringency, rm activity may also generate positive spillovers. For example, the foreign
exchange earnings of exporting rms can alleviate devaluation pressures on local currencies.
Alternately, innovative rms generate knowledge spillovers that can raise factor productivity
sector-wide. We capture the tendency of a rm to generate regulation-inhibited spillovers to
8As g falls, the rm's costs, gT, of delivering rents T to the regulator fall. Provided the regulator puts
positive weight on the rm's transfer costs, then a fall in g also raises her net valuation, T   cgT, of the
transfer received.



































Because regulation inhibits production and sales, when spillovers are large the regulator
prefers lax regulation. This moves the regulator's preferred stringency in the direction of
the rm's. This increased coincidence of interests reduces both threatpoint and equilibrium
stringency, with the former falling faster such that exerted inuence falls. The other metric
of inuence, X0   X, on the other hand, rises, since X0 ignores spillovers and prots and
thus dX0=dn = 0. In sum, our model predicts rms that generate positive spillovers will
face less regulatory interference, exert less inuence but enjoy greater eective inuence.
3.5 Competition
Thus far we have implicitly assumed regulations are rm-specic. In reality, businesses
also face regulatory interference in the form of sector-wide regulations that impinge on all
rms active in the rm's industry. This makes it costly to weaken regulations across the
board for the benet of the politically active rm|holding constant the scale of that rm's
activity|when there are a large number of other rms active in that same sector. A more
thorough treatment of the multiple-rm problem would model the potential for collective
action, allowing for the endogenous formation of (multiple) lobby groups, a vector of regula-
tions (some of which are rm-specic and some of which are sector-wide), and interactions
between rms in downstream markets. This is outside the scope of our analysis. However,
we can oer some predictions as to how the presence of industry-level competition aects
a single rm's equilibrium inuence and interference if we are willing to impose the follow-
ing assumptions on our model. Specically, we assume that the rm's competitors do not
lobby the regulator themselves, competition does not aect 0(X) (i.e. the marginal eect
of regulation on the rm's own prots), and regulatory scale economies occur at the plant
level only. In what follows we also hold constant the scale of the politically active rm's
12activity, setting  = 1 for clarity. Under the aforementioned assumptions, we can adapt the
model to account for industry-wide regulation by introducing a simple scale parameter  
and writing G(X;T) =  [s(X)+nN(X)+b(X) e(X)z]+T[  cg], where z = z(1), and
keeping the form of R unchanged from before. In this formulation, regulation-augmenting
and -inhibiting spillovers are increasing in  , as are regulatory costs and sector-level prots;





















where 4  00+
g
 cg [s00+b00+nN00 e00z] < 0: One proxy for the scale of other-rm activity
is the number of competitors in the rm's industry. Under this interpretation, our model
suggests that a rm's equilibrium regulation will be increasing in the amount of competition
it faces, while its exerted and eective inuence will decline.
4. Data
Our empirical analysis uses the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a survey of
over 10,000 rms in 80 countries and one territory conducted in 1999-2000. The survey
was conducted though face-to-face interviews with rm managers and owners and covers a
large range of questions concerning the rm's relationship with the government, including
perceptions of regulations, corruption, inuence, macroeconomic policies, competition, and
infrastructure.9 We use data from all countries except those in Africa and the Middle East as
these regions do not have data on rm beliefs about inuence on government. The countries
for which there was at least one rm with all the data required for our base specication
are listed in Table 17 in the Appendix. Denitions and summary statistics for the variables
used in our analysis are discussed in this section. Motivation for choice of variables and
hypotheses are given in Section 5.
9Permanent url http://go.worldbank.org/RV060VBJU0
134.1 Inuence over Government
Our rst empirical question is how inuence depends on rm characteristics. The WBES
asked managers for each of the Executive, Legislature, Ministry and Regulatory Agency of
the national government of the country in which they were operating:
\When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a
substantial impact on your business, how much inuence does your rm typically
have at the national level of government on the content of that law, rule, regula-
tion or decree? Would you say very inuential, frequently inuential, inuential,
seldom inuential or never inuential?"
Summary statistics reported in Table 1 show that for all four branches of government
most rms feel that they are \Never" inuential. The four branches of government appear
to have very similar levels of susceptibility to inuence.
Table 1: Inuence Data Summary. Percentage of rms in each category and total observa-
tions. The four branches of government appear to have very similar levels of susceptibility to
inuence and in all branches almost two thirds of rms feel that they are \Never" inuential.
Variable Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always Obs.
% % % % %
Inuence Executive 61 21 10 4 3 6095
Inuence Legislature 63 21 9 4 3 6104
Inuence Ministry 62 21 10 5 3 6094
Inuence Regulator 60 21 12 5 3 5971
A high degree of co-linearity between the four measures of inuence in Table 110 suggests
that treating them as four separate dependent variables would amount to duplication and
limit the space available for other analysis and robustness checks. However, the ordinal
nature of the variables means that creating a composite variable by averaging or adding
them is not appropriate. Additionally, we have no means by which to judge which of the
four measures of inuence is the most important for any given rm, since the most important
branch of government over which to exert inuence is likely to vary by rm and country of
operation. Thus we present our base regression for inuence for all four branches separately
and for a variable constructed from the maximum reported inuence over any branch of
10Pair-wise correlations for the four inuence variables range from 0:77   0:83.
14government for each rm (henceforth referred to as the `maximum-inuence variable').11 In
order to save space all variations on our base regression (for robustness checks etc.) use only
the maximum inuence as the dependent variable.
4.2 Regulatory Constraint
The second set of dependent variables of interest is the constraint caused by dierent types
of regulations. The WBES interviewers asked managers:
\Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are these dierent regula-
tory areas for the operation and growth of your business...Environmental Regu-
lations, Business Licensing, Customs/Foreign Trade Regulations in your country,
Labor Regulations, Foreign Currency/Exchange Regulations, Fire & Safety Reg-
ulations, Tax Regulations/Administration, High Taxes".
Possible responses for each regulatory area were: 1 (No Obstacle), 2 (Minor Obstacle), 3
(Moderate Obstacle), or 4 (Major Obstacle).
Table 2 shows that High Taxes are a major obstacles for more than half the rms. The
next most constraining regulatory area was Tax Regulations/Administration followed by
Labor Regulations and Business Licensing.
Table 2: Regulatory Constraint Data Summary. Percentage of rms in each category, mean,
and total observations. Median response for each variable shown in bold.
Variable No Minor Moderate Major Mean Obs.
% % % %
Environment Reg. 41 28 21 10 2.01 7710
Labour Reg. 35 28 24 14 2.18 7990
Fire, Safety Reg. 44 31 18 07 1.88 7903
Business Licensing 40 23 23 14 2.10 7821
High Taxes 09 11 22 58 3.29 7985
Tax Regs., Admin. 17 20 31 32 2.78 8029
Foreign Exchange Reg. 48 23 17 11 1.91 7237
Customs, Trade Reg. 37 23 26 14 2.18 6882
11For example, if a rm reports inuence scores of 1, 1, 2, and 3 for the Executive, Regulator, Legislature
and Ministry respectively, then the maximum-inuence variable takes a value of 3 for that rm.
154.3 Explanatory Variables
The WBES data contains a number of rm characteristics which we might expect to be asso-
ciated with a rm's ability to inuence government decisions and its experience of regulatory
constraint. The motivation for including and hypotheses related to each of the selected right
hand side variables is discussed in Section 5. In the current section we describe the variables
and present summary statistics. The variables on the right hand side in our base regressions
are:12
 Size: coded 1 for small (5   50 employees), 2 for medium (51   500 employees) and 3
for large (> 500 employees),
 Government: coded 1 if rms reported having any share of government ownership, 0
otherwise,
 Exporter: coded 1 if rms export some product, 0 otherwise,
 Foreign: coded 1 if rms report at least 10% foreign ownership, 0 otherwise,
 Multi-country: coded 1 if rms report having operations or holdings in other countries,
0 otherwise,
 Age: coded 1 for 0 5 years, 2 for 6 20 years, and 3 for more than 20 years rm age,
 Sector: manufacturing, services, agriculture, construction, and other,
 Number of competitors: coded 0 for no competitors, 1 for one to three competitors
and 3 for more than three competitors,13 and
 Country of operation of respondent rm.
Since the variables are categorical they are summarized as their component binary vari-
ables in Table 3 where the mean value is the fraction of reporting rms which are in that
category. Countries included in the analysis are listed in Table 17 in the Appendix. Table
3 shows that sample size and proportion in each category are sucient for identication
of regression coecients. In some cases - for example foreign rms - this is the result of
intentional over-sampling in the survey design.
12We also make use of a number of other variables from the WBES in our robustness checks. Variables
used in the robustness checks are discussed in Section 7.
13There were also codings for various forms on non-response. Dummies for these were included in the
regression in order to minimize potential selection bias due to non-response but coecients are not reported
in the regressions.
16Table 3: Summary of Binary Explanatory Variables. Mean value is the fraction of reporting
rms which are in that category. N represents the number of valid responses to the question
from which the binary fraction was generated. The mean multiplied by N gives the number














Other sectors 0.158 7,611
No competitors 0.069 7,367
Few Competitors 0.143 7,367
Many Competitors 0.788 7,367
Given that much of the political economy literature has concentrated on the action of
groups rather than rms, we may be concerned that only large rms have any political
inuence. Table 4 presents a cross-tabulation of rm size with our maximum inuence
variable and shows that while larger rms tend to be more inuential, there are non-negligible
proportions of small and medium sized rms which also consider themselves inuential. Even
among small rms nearly 40% report having at least some inuence.
Table 4: Maximum Inuence proportion of responses \Never" and \Very" inuential by size
category. While larger rms tend to be more inuential, they are not the only inuential
rms.
Size Category
Max. Inuence Small Medium Large All
Never Inuential 0.63 0.50 0.30 0.51
Very Inuential 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05
Total 2,372 2,767 1,108 6,247
175. Empirical Approach
The empirical part of this paper treats rm characteristics as explanatory variables in re-
gressions in which either a measure of inuence or a measure of regulatory obstacle is the
dependent variable. Although we explicitly model inuence and regulatory constraint, our
model does not provide a handy exclusion restriction or instrument which would allow us
to cleanly identify the impact of exogenous changes in inuence on the observed regulatory
constraint. Nor do we claim the WBES data contains sucient controls for the endogenous
determinants of inuence that we can claim that residual inuence is exogenous.14 Thus
our objectives are more humble, namely to show that not all characteristics which increase
a rm's inuence will decrease the regulatory constraint it faces; and to show that the em-
pirical relationships we observe are consistent with a very general model in which variations
in the government's costs and benets of regulating a rm induce variations in the rm's
inuence over the government.
The results presented in the body of this paper are discrete eects from binary probit
models. A range of alternative models were considered, including ordered probit, logit,
partial proportional odds, heterogeneous logit, and probit with a Heckman correction for
selection bias. The Appendix discusses each of these estimators and reports coecient
estimates for regressions with dependent variables Maximum Inuence, and constraints from
Environmental Regulations, and High Taxes. The standard probit model results were chosen
for presentation in the body of the paper as there was no clear preferred estimator, all of
the alternative estimators had substantively the same qualitative results, and the calculation
and interpretation of eects is most straightforward for the binary probit model.
In order to estimate a probit model, the responses for each of the dependent variables
were aggregated to form binary groupings. Since at least 60% of rms report Never being
inuential, the inuence categories Seldom-Always were aggregated. For all the regulations
repsonses No and Minor obstacle were aggregated to form one group, and responses Moderate
and Major were aggregated to form the other.15
14When we did test including inuence on the right hand side in the regulatory constraint regressions we
found it weakly positively correlated with constraint.
15An alternative approach would be to aggregate the response categories so that as near as possible to half
the sample was in each of the two new groups. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 the appropriate aggregation
varied by dependent variable. For all Inuence variables the groups remain divided between \Never" and
\Seldom" inuential. For environmental, re, business licensing and foreign exchange regulations the division
was between \No Obstacle" and \Minor Obstacle". For labor, tax regulation & administration, and customs
& trade regulations the division was between \Minor Obstacle" and \Moderate Obstacle". This approach
leads to essentially the same conclusions as the approach reported here.
18The explanatory variables in our base regressions are dened in Section 4.3. All categori-
cal explanatory variables were included in the regressions as sets of dummies. The remainder
of this section motivates the inclusion of each of these explanatory variables and states hy-
potheses about the sign of the coecients based - where possible - on the comparative statics
in Section 3. Robustness checks are discussed in Section 7.
Firm size has the most direct connection to our model of any of the variables in the
WBES survey. Firm size is measured small, medium, or large according to the number of
workers and is the best available measure of the parameter  in our model. Accordingly,
we expect size to be correlated positively with both inuence and regulatory constraint
when there are economies of scale in regulation. We classify Environmental, Labor and Fire
regulations as areas with high economies of scale for the regulator since travel for on-site
inspection is required for monitoring.
Government ownership also has a fairly direct interpretation in our model. Govern-
ments internalize costs and benets to rms (or parts thereof) which they own, which we
interpret as a higher franchise b in the theoretical model. The comparative static results
are that higher franchise raises eective inuence and lowers equilibrium regulation. Fur-
thermore, because governments are more likely to own rms which provide public goods, we
expect government owned rms to have higher n on average, which also reduces equilibrium
regulation and increases eective inuence.
Exporting rms earn foreign exchange which empirical evidence suggests many govern-
ments view as a positive spillover. This suggests n is higher for exporters which should lead
to greater eective inuence and less regulatory constraint. However, as per Melitz (2003),
exporters may have higher productivity than average, suggesting  is higher for them if in-
puts (i.e. workers) are held constant. High  argues in favor of greater eective inuence
but more regulatory constraint. On net, exporters are predicted to have high inuence but
an ambiguous correlation with regulatory obstacles.
Multi-country rms (those which have operations or holdings in other countries) have
been argued to be particularly procient political operators due to factors such as scale
economies and learning by doing in lobbying eorts (Boddewyn 1988, Desbordes and Vauday
2007). In our model lobbying eciency is represented by lower values of g, suggesting
greater inuence and lower regulatory constraint. However, similarly to exporting rms,
new international economics suggests multi-national rms are the most productive rms.
Thus  is higher for them if inputs (i.e. workers) are held constant constant, which suggests
19higher inuence but more regulatory constraint.
Foreign owned rms, like rms that operate abroad, may have lower lobbying costs, g,
due to scale economies arising from lobbying activities overseas. Lower g leads to increased
inuence and decreased equilibrium regulation. A substantial literature also assumes that
foreign rms are more likely to be politically disenfranchised, leading to low intrinsic inuence
b. Lowering b lowers eective inuence and increases equilibrium regulation. Countering
the eect of disenfranchisement is the possibility, also supported by a signicant literature,
that foreign multinationals bring positive spillovers via technology and knowledge transfer.
This corresponds to high n which increases inuence and lowers equilibrium regulation.
Finally, consistent with the discussion for multi-country rms, foreign-owned rms may have
high , causing higher inuence and higher regulatory constraint. Overall, we cannot make
any unambiguous predictions about the relationship between foreign ownership and either
inuence or equilibrium regulation.
Competition. The degree of competition in a sector reects the amount of extra-rm
activity aected by sector-wide regulations constraining an individual rm. Stated dier-
ently, the number of competitors proxies the extent of collective action failures. Accordingly,
we expect rms with competition to exhibit higher  , face greater regulatory constraint, and
exert less inuence.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize our empirical predictions.
Table 5: Correspondence between WBES variables, model parameters, sign of comparative
statics and signs of regression coecients for inuence as dependent variable.
WBES Variable Model Parameter(s) Predicted Sign Empirical Correlation
Size  Positive Positive
Govt. Ownership b, n Positive Positive
Exporter n,  Positive Positive
Foreign Owned n, b, g, Ambiguous None
Multi-country  g, Positive Positive
Competition   Negative Negative
6. Results
Table 7 reports discrete eects and standard errors for the base specication for inuence.
The dependent variables in columns 1   4 respectively are inuence over Executive, Leg-
20Table 6: Correspondence between WBES variables, model parameters, sign of comparative
statics and signs of regression coecients for regulatory constraint as dependent variable.
WBES Variable Model Parameter(s) Predicted Sign Empirical Correlation
Size  Positive or Nonea Positive or Nonea
Govt. Ownership b, n Negative Negative or None
Exporter n, Ambiguous Noneb
Foreign Owned n, b, g, Ambiguous Negative or None
Multi-country  g, Ambiguous Negative or Noneb
Competition   Positive Positive or None
a Positive where there are economies of scale in regulation (i.e. environment, labor and re regu-
lations), no correlation where there are no obvious scale economies for the regulator.
b Excluding Foreign Exchange and Customs & Trade regulations, which aect exporting rms and
rms with overseas operations more for obvious reasons.
islature, Ministry, and Regulator.16 The dependent variable in column 5 is the Maximum
Inuence reported by the rm across any of the four branches of government. The results
in all ve columns are consistent in terms of sign and signicance17, and two-sample t-tests
cannot reject the null that the eects are the same across the columns. In light of this con-
sistency we run all our robustness checks using only the \Maximum Inuence" dependent
variable and focus on these results in the following discussion.
Consistent with one of our model's central predictions, medium and large rms are sig-
nicantly more inuential than small rms (the excluded category) in all columns of Table 7.
The results in column 5 show that medium-sized rms are around 10% less likely and large
rms are around 20% less likely to report never being inuential over government decisions
of importance to their rm. The dierence between the medium and large rm eects is
statistically as well as economically signicant.
Also consistent with our model's predictions, the eects for Government, Exporter, and
Multi-country operations are positive and signicant in all columns of Table 7. Govern-
ment ownership is associated with a 12% increase in the probability of being inuential and
Exporter and Multi-country are respectively associated with increases of around 5% and 6%.
The results for the impact of increasing competition for a rm are also consistent with
our predictions, though somewhat less statistically signicant. Firms with Few or Many
competitors are respectively around 5% and 7% more likely to report never inuencing
government than rms with no competitors (the excluded group). Finally for Table 7 we
16Discrete eects are the appropriate counterpart to marginal eects for categorical explanatory variables.
17With the exception of the eect of having \many competitors" when \Inuence on the Regulator" is the
dependent variable.
21Table 7: Probit regressions using rm characteristics to predict probability of having inu-
ence (>\never") on dierent branches of government. Average discrete eects for change
in dummy variables from 0 to 1 reported. Dummies for sector, country, and age category
included but results not reported.
Executive Legislator Ministry Regulator Max
Medium 0.0828** 0.0619** 0.0800** 0.0833** 0.0951**
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0152)
Large 0.201** 0.171** 0.215** 0.189** 0.215**
(0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0213)
Government 0.114** 0.125** 0.118** 0.0995** 0.120**
(0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0216) (0.0206)
Exporter 0.0405** 0.0417** 0.0603** 0.0450** 0.0544**
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0159)
Foreign -0.00366 -0.0171 0.00240 0.0307 0.0199
(0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0200) (0.0203)
Multi-country 0.0809** 0.0721** 0.0885** 0.0678** 0.0625**
(0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0198) (0.0198)
Few Compet. -0.0418 -0.0513 -0.0372 -0.0291 -0.0537
(0.0287) (0.0276) (0.0280) (0.0296) (0.0295)
Many Compet. -0.0532* -0.0636* -0.0607* -0.0489 -0.0721**
(0.0263) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0266) (0.0259)
Observations 5214 5220 5210 5110 5363
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
see that Foreign ownership appears to be uncorrelated with inuence. This suggests that if
foriegn rms are politically disenfranchised, its impact is balanced by foreign rms lobbying
experience and/or their perceived positive spillovers.
Tables 8 and 9 report coecients for the probit regressions of whether regulations were
at least a \Moderate" (i.e. > \Minor") obstacle to the operation and growth of the rm's
business. The regulatory areas reported in Table 8 are Environment, Labor, and Fire - all
of which we suggest are characterized by economies of scale for the regulator since they
require on-site inspection. The regulatory areas in Table 9 are Business Licensing, High
Taxes, Tax Administration/regulation, Foreign Exchange regulations, and Customs & Trade
regulations. We classify these areas as being less characterized by economies of scale in
regulation. Across the eight regressions in Tables 8 and 9 all of the statistically signicant
results conrm our model's predictions.18
18The results are consistent with our model with the exception of Multi-country rms nding Customs &
Trade regulations more of an obstacle and Exporting rms nding both Foreign Exchange and Customs &
Trade regulations more of an obstacle than otherwise similar rms. The obvious reason for these exceptions
22Table 8: Probit regressions using rm characteristics to predict probability of constraint
(>\minor") by regulations in areas characterized by economies of scale. Average discrete
eects for change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 reported. Dummies for sector, country,
and age category included but results not reported.
Environment Labor Fire
Medium 0.0361** 0.0447** 0.0321*
(0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0128)
Large 0.0701** 0.0443* 0.0197
(0.0201) (0.0186) (0.0188)
Government 0.00889 -0.0259 -0.00261
(0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0173)
Exporter 0.00276 0.0108 -0.0207
(0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0125)
Foreign -0.00406 -0.0453** 0.00909
(0.0170) (0.0158) (0.0164)
Multi-country -0.0318 -0.000736 -0.00816
(0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0162)
Few Compet. 0.0470 0.0658* -0.00217
(0.0290) (0.0280) (0.0260)
Many Compet. 0.0273 0.0516* -0.00523
(0.0236) (0.0229) (0.0228)
Observations 6773 7019 6945
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Consistent with our model but possibly contrary to popular expectation, medium and
large rms nd the regulations at least as much of an impediment to the operation and
growth of their business as otherwise similar small rms. Large and Medium-sized rms are
respectively 7% and close to 4% more likely to identify Environmental regulations as at least
a moderate obstacle. The corresponding size eects for Labor regulations are both around
4%, while for Fire regulations we identify signicantly more of a constraint for Medium-sized
rms only. The lack of eect identied for Large rms is likely due to insucient variation
in the binary variable created by grouping \No" and \Minor" together since Fire regulations
are generally the least constraining of all. When the probit regression is run with \No"
obstactle as one group and \Minor"|\Major" as the other, the Medium-sized rm eect is
close to 6% and the Large-size eect is over 9%; both are signicant at the 1% level.
Also consistent with our model and of no surprise, government-owned rms generally nd
regulation less of an obstacle, though this eect is stronger in Table 8 then in Table 9. The
is the signicantly higher exposure of these globalized rms to these types of regulations.
23Table 9: Probit regressions using rm characteristics to predict probability of constraint
(>\minor") by regulations in areas not characterized by economies of scale. Average discrete
eects for change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 reported. Dummies for sector, country,
and age category included but results not reported.
Bus.Lic. H.Tax TaxAd. ForEx Customs
Medium -0.0156 -0.00959 0.0115 0.00194 0.0224
(0.0136) (0.0110) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0150)
Large 0.0251 -0.00568 -0.0203 -0.0271 0.0208
(0.0198) (0.0154) (0.0193) (0.0182) (0.0211)
Government -0.0490** -0.0574** -0.0426* -0.0244 -0.0607**
(0.0186) (0.0161) (0.0186) (0.0179) (0.0198)
Exporter -0.0171 0.00971 0.00448 0.0577** 0.0874**
(0.0137) (0.0108) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0149)
Foreign -0.0116 -0.0205 -0.0155 0.00505 0.00611
(0.0175) (0.0140) (0.0172) (0.0163) (0.0182)
Multi-country 0.0176 -0.0424** -0.00664 0.0294 0.0493**
(0.0180) (0.0145) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0187)
Few Compet. 0.0255 0.0424* 0.0705** 0.0534 0.0690*
(0.0288) (0.0188) (0.0252) (0.0299) (0.0310)
Many Compet. 0.0556* 0.101** 0.0917** 0.0540* 0.0784**
(0.0241) (0.0203) (0.0237) (0.0234) (0.0254)
Observations 6868 7017 7052 6322 6005
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
signicant negative eects associated with government ownership are for Business Licensing,
High Taxes, Tax administration, and Customs & Trade regulations. Government rms do
not seem to enjoy any regulatory slack in the areas of Environmental, Labor, or Fire safety;
possibly because these areas are the most visible and sensitive to the public.
Interestingly, despite their substantially higher reported inuence, Exporters generally
report at the same levels of regulatory constraint as other rms. The exceptions to this result
are Foreign Exchange and Customs & Trade regulations, which exporters are signicantly
more likely to identify as at least a moderate constraint. The reasons for the exception in
these areas is self-evident. The lack of identiable regulatory advantage enjoyed by exporters
may, paradoxically, be because they are more ecient. More ecient rms will generally
be `larger' than other rms with the same number of workers, which may mean that the
exporter coecient is capturing some size eects from our model.
Foreign ownership is generally associated with slightly lower regulatory constraint, though
this eect is only statistically signicant with regard to Labor regulations. Multi-country
24rms | i.e. those which have operations or holdings in other countries | are generally very
slightly and statistically insignicantly less constrained by regulations. The exceptions are
High Taxes, which multi-country rms nd signicantly less of an obstacle, and Customs
& Trade regulations which they nd more of an obstacle than otherwise similar rms. The
negative correlation with tax constraint may indicate that multi-country rms employ their
superior lobbying capabilities primarily to reduce tax burden. This is plausible since high
taxes are the highest obstacle for almost all rms. Alternatively the low tax constraint may
indicate that multi-country rms are able to employ techniques such as transfer pricing to
avoid legislated tax burdens. The positive and signicant correlation of overseas operations
with Customs & trade regulations likely arises because they are disproportionately exposed
due to intra-rm trade.
Finally in Tables 8 and 9 we see that in all regulatory areas except Fire, the eects of
having Few Competitors or Many Competitors are positive as predicted, and in most cases
signicantly dierent from zero.19 The lack of signicant eect of increased competition
observed in the regressions for Environmental and Fire regulations is likely due to the relative
lack of variation in our binary dependent variable for these regulations. The ordered probit
estimator in Table 11 and the generalized ordered probit estimates in Table 14 both make
use of the full variation in responses for constraint from Environmental regulations, and both
nd positive and signicant coecients for the competition variables.
7. Additional controls and Regional differences
Numerous additional variables from the WBES dataset were used to test the robustness of
the results obtained in our base specication. Some of these robustness checks addressed po-
tential omitted variable biases due to other determinants of inuence, while others addressed
potential survey-related biases such as representativeness of sampling and general optimism
of the respondent.
Table 16 in the Appendix shows the robustness of the results to controlling for additional
potential determinants of inuence. Each of the additional controls was identied in at least
one other recent paper using the same or similar data (Chong and Gradstein 2007, Campos
and Giovannoni 2007, Desai and Olofsgard 2008), however none of them have been included
in our base regression because of concerns about data quality and/or endogeniety (explained
19\No Competitors" is the excluded category.
25in the footnotes to this paragraph). Column 1 of Table 16 reports the coecient estimates
for our base regression whose discrete eects are reported in column 5 of Table 7. Column
2 controls for the concentration of ownership in the rm.20 Column 3 controls for the legal
organization of the rm.21 Column 4 controls for two measures of the rms perceptions of
corruption.22 Column 5 controls for the location of the rm's headquarters.23 None of these
controls substantively aect our results.
The next empirical concern addressed in our robustness checks is the issue of respondent
heterogeneity aecting ordinal responses. Desai and Olofsgard, p.13 pay close attention to
this issue, noting that
\Dierent respondents may interpret concepts such as \inuence" in vastly
dierent ways based on unobservable characteristics (\culture," socialization,
etc.). Ordinal scales may mean dierent things to dierent respondents based on
idiosyncratic factors such as mood or overall optimism."
One way of ameliorating problems caused by respondent heterogeneity is to control for the
overall optimism of the respondent by including variables which believe should aect all rms
equally. Following Desai and Olofsgard we use managers' responses to questions about the
degree to which they view macroeconomic instability (specically ination) as a constraint
to their business as a proxy for the propensity of the respondent to complain.24 We also
checked the robustness of our results to two alternative proxies for the overall optimism of
the respondents which we consider posed less of an endodgeniety problem that the ination
variable, namely how problematic they consider street crime/theft/disorder, and organized
crime/Maa for the operation and growth of their business.
Finally, with regard to respondent heterogeneity, we considered unobserved variation in
20The ownership concentration question was asked dierently in the Eastern European sample so inter-
action terms are included to allow dierent coecients on concentration. Response rate was low for this
question.
21\What is the legal organization of this company?" Options were: Single proprietorship, Partnership,
Cooperative, Corporation, privately-held, Corporation listed on a stock exchange, Other. The \Other"
category signicantly overlapped with the Government ownership variable in our base regression.
22We included responses to two questions. \Changes in rules, laws and regulations are: completely pre-
dictable,..., completely unpredictable." and \It is common for rms in my line of business to have to pay
some irregular additional payments to get things done: always, ..., seldom." We had concerns about the
endogeneity of these two variables in our context, a concern which was validated by the fact that rms who
thought bribery was more common were likely to be less inuential.
23Response rate for this question was low leading to a substantial reduction in sample size.
24It is not altogether clear ex ante that the impact of macroeconomic instability should be the same for
all types of rms. In particular, it seems likely that the impact of these variables might vary systematically
with some of our variables of interest, such as foreign connections.
26the respondents' general attitudes specically toward the government in the country of oper-
ation. These attitudes may vary for cultural or historical reasons, or due to the respondent's
personal experiences outside the management of their rm. Including proxies for these at-
titudes in the base regression specication is not justied as reverse causality from success
in inuencing government to general attitudes may bias the coecients. On the other hand,
ignoring this source of heterogeneity may lead to omitted variable bias. Thus we run an
additional robustness check in which we include a number of proxies for general attitude
toward government, namely the responses to the questions:
 Please evaluate the following statement: \The process of developing new rules, regu-
lations or policies is usually such that businesses are informed in advance of changes
aecting them." This is true: always, mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never.
 Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in economic and nancial
policies which materially aect your business? Responses were on a six-point scale
from completely predictable to completely unpredictable.
 Please rate your overall perception of the relation between government and/or bureau-
cracy and private rms on the following scale. \All in all, for doing business I perceive
the state as": very helpful, mildly helpful, neutral, mildly unhelpful, very unhelpful.
The question was asked separately for national and local governments.
Since none of our attempts to address unobserved respondent heterogeneity had a ma-
terial eect on our results we do not report them in the paper.25 Our interpretation of the
nding of no eect on our coecients of interest is that although unobserved respondent
heterogeneity is certainly present, it did not cause bias because it was not correlated with
our explanatory variables of interest.
Our nal robustness consideration is regional dierences. Our model has been designed
with minimal institutional assumptions in order to be applicable to a wide variety of dif-
ferent government around the world. This does not, however, preclude signicant regional
dierences in the model parameters, such as weights in the governments objective function.
Particularly where the model's predictions are ambiguous we might expect the empirical
results to vary regionally. Results for probit regressions run on the regional subsamples are
given in Tables 18-20 in the Appendix. While there is some regional variation in the coe-
cients, the main dierence between the regional results and the pooled results is the increase
25Please contact the authors for these results.
27in standard errors due to reduced sample size.26 The only coecient in Tables 18-20 which is
not consistent with our model predictions is that for Large rms in the High Tax constraint
regression for the OECD sample. It appears larger rms in the OECD either face less tax
burden or are able to creatively manage their accounts in order to substantially avoid the
legislated burden.
8. Conclusion
Do corporations inuence regulators? Probably. Do inuential rms fare better than less
inuential ones? Maybe|it depends on why these rms are inuential in the rst place.
We employ a simple but general theoretical model that highlights the dierent forms of
inuence: intrinsic and exerted. We identify rm-level primitives including size, ownership,
and exporter status, which simultaneously determine the extent to which the rm inuences,
and faces interference from, regulators. Our model predicts that when high inuence is the
result of positive production spillovers, low lobbying frictions, market monopoly, or high
enfranchisement, inuence and regulatory obstacle correlate negatively as one would expect.
However, when a rm's inuence is driven by its size, our model predicts a positive correlation
between inuence and regulatory interference.
We test our predictions using the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey
(WBES). We nd that our model correctly predicts rm-level determinants of inuence
surprisingly consistently across a wide range of countries and across legislative, executive,
ministerial, and regulatory branches of government. While inuence is not exclusive to large
rms, we nd that larger rms are more likely to report being inuential at all levels of
government. We also test the generality of our model by applying it across the full range
of regulatory areas in the dataset. Large rms are no less likely | and in some regulatory
areas signicantly more likely | to experience at least moderate levels of regulatory obstacle
to the operation and growth of their business. We similarly nd that while exporting and
multi-country rms report high levels of inuence, there is only occasional evidence that
these outward-oriented rms face less regulatory constraint. In contrast, government-owned
rms do enjoy signicantly greater inuence and lower regulatory constraint in many areas,
26An alternative approach to the standard errors would have been to run the pooled regression and include
a full set of interaction terms. This would have maintained the assumption that the standard errors were
equal across the samples. If this assumption were correct then the pooled regression with interaction terms
would be more ecient than running the regressions on separate samples. However, if the assumption were
violated then it could bias the coecient estimates given the nonlinear estimator.
28likely reecting such rms' high intrinsic inuence.
Our analysis has implications for the empirical literature on inuence on regulatory out-
comes. The ambiguity of our comparative statics concerning transfers suggests that the
indeterminacy of the empirical relationship between political contributions and voting be-
havior may never be resolved. However, direct survey measures of inuence aren't necessarily
superior. A rm's overall inuence is endogenous; it derives from a variety of sources; and
it correlates ambiguously with regulatory constraint.
While our analysis is largely positive, our results also carry normative implications rele-
vant to public debate and academic study. Within one model we are able to rationalize both
how large rms may claim to be carrying more than `their share' of regulatory burden, and
how critics can claim large rms use transfers to achieve `disproportionate' inuence, thereby
diverting regulations away from their social optimum. Meanwhile rms that are intrinsically
inuential because their welfare is valued highly by the policy-setter (e.g. government-owned
rms) may enjoy ineciently lax regulations from a Utilitarian perspective, without exerting
much inuence through transfers. Finally, rms which produce positive spillovers may cause
little distortion relative to the Utilitarian optimum while still being highly inuential and
enjoying lower regulatory constraint. Thus we conclude that understanding the source rms'
inuence is important for correctly identifying the normative motivation for research in this
eld.
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319. Appendix
Tables 10-15 report coecient estimates from a variety of estimation techniques for the
dependent variables Maximum Inuence, constraint from Environmental Regulations, and
constraint from High Taxes. We briey summarize what we view as the empirical implica-
tions of these results in the respective table headers. The remainder of this section briey
discusses the dierent estimators and their reason for inclusion in the robustness checks.
Table 10: Maximum Inuence: coecient estimates from a range of estimators are essentially
consistent. The probit estimator in column 1 is the basis of the discrete eects reported in
the body of the paper. Dummies for sector, country, and age category included but results
not reported.
Probit Heck.Prob. Ord.Prob. Het.Ord. Logit
Medium 0.285** 0.271** 0.231** 0.273** 0.466**
(0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0410) (0.0603) (0.0744)
Large 0.642** 0.623** 0.468** 0.512** 1.058**
(0.0628) (0.0629) (0.0526) (0.0971) (0.105)
Government 0.346** 0.316** 0.311** 0.294** 0.564**
(0.0599) (0.0608) (0.0484) (0.0641) (0.0990)
Exporter 0.157** 0.148** 0.136** 0.107** 0.255**
(0.0451) (0.0449) (0.0389) (0.0408) (0.0745)
Foreign 0.0420 0.0353 0.0181 0.0131 0.0732
(0.0580) (0.0576) (0.0473) (0.0427) (0.0965)
Multi-country 0.182** 0.178** 0.183** 0.150** 0.292**
(0.0561) (0.0558) (0.0453) (0.0482) (0.0928)
Few Compet. -0.170 -0.168 -0.190** -0.145* -0.291*
(0.0874) (0.0865) (0.0727) (0.0705) (0.145)
Many Compet. -0.222** -0.220** -0.228** -0.214** -0.371**
(0.0745) (0.0738) (0.0625) (0.0674) (0.123)
Observations 5456 7238 5456 5456 5456
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
The rst column in Tables 10-12 reports coecient estimates and standard errors which
correspond to the discrete eects reported in the body of the paper and can be considered
our base estimator. The second column reports estimates from a probit model with Heckman
correction for selection bias due to non-random missing responses. The rm's proportion of
all questions with missing responses was used as an instrument in the selection equation.
While the test statistic rejected the null of no bias, the results in Tables 10-12 show that the
bias was not substantive. In the one case in which the selection-corrected results diered in
terms of signicance from our base regression, the corrected results were more in line with
our model's predictions.
The third column in Tables 10-12 reports estimates from an ordered probit model. Or-
dered logit or probit models are a popular choice for ordered survey response dependent
32Table 11: Constraint from Environmental Regulations: coecient estimates from a range of
estimators are essentially consistent. The probit estimator in column 1 is the basis of the
discrete eects reported in the body of the paper. Dummies for sector, country, and age
category included but results not reported.
Probit Heck.Prob. Ord.Prob. Het.Ord. Logit
Medium 0.109** 0.0997* 0.127** 0.118** 0.186**
(0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0343) (0.0305) (0.0688)
Large 0.207** 0.199** 0.223** 0.189** 0.349**
(0.0579) (0.0579) (0.0473) (0.0432) (0.0961)
Government 0.0269 0.0143 -0.00411 -0.0243 0.0445
(0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0469) (0.0349) (0.0921)
Exporter 0.00839 0.00190 0.0272 0.0240 0.0127
(0.0413) (0.0412) (0.0344) (0.0243) (0.0685)
Foreign -0.0124 -0.00395 -0.0426 -0.00856 -0.0227
(0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0402) (0.0278) (0.0858)
Multi-country -0.0985 -0.103* -0.0705 -0.0475 -0.168
(0.0525) (0.0523) (0.0413) (0.0291) (0.0874)
Few Compet. 0.140 0.135 0.172* 0.0924 0.240
(0.0847) (0.0844) (0.0710) (0.0548) (0.143)
Many Compet. 0.0837 0.0770 0.123* 0.0535 0.150
(0.0732) (0.0730) (0.0620) (0.0480) (0.124)
Observations 6773 7165 6774 6774 6773
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
variables such as the ones used in this paper. However, statistical tests suggested that the
parallel lines assumption required by ordered logit or probit estimators did not hold in our
data.27
The forth column in Tables 10-12 reports estimates from the heteroskedastic ordered
probit model estimator of Williams (2009). The test built into Williams's OGLM com-
mand in Stata indicated that the homoskedasticity assumption was violated for some of our
variables of interest, leading to potentially biased coecient estimates. Comparison for the
Heteroskastistic Ordered model estimates to the other columns in Tables 10-12 suggests the
induced bias was not substantial.
The nal column in Tables 10-12 reports logit model estimates which suggest that the
choice of assumed error variance | while not immaterial | does not qualitatively aect our
conclusions.
Given that the parallel lines assumption does not hold for at least some of our explanatory
variables, a generalized ordered probit model may an appropriate alternative to the ordered
27Wolfe and Gould's \omodel" approximate likelihood ratio test for Stata reported p-values of less than
0.02 for all dependent variables. Brant tests of the parallel regression assumption after ologit were also
signicant for at least some explanatory variables of interest for each dependent variable.
33Table 12: Constraint from High Taxes: coecient estimates from a range of estimators are
essentially consistent. The probit estimator in column 1 is the basis of the discrete eects
reported in the body of the paper. Dummies for sector, country, and age category included
but results not reported.
Probit Heck.Prob. Ord.Prob. Het.Ord. Logit
Medium -0.0403 -0.0449 0.0457 0.0103 -0.0805
(0.0461) (0.0458) (0.0367) (0.0261) (0.0820)
Large -0.0237 -0.0231 -0.0431 -0.0540 -0.0421
(0.0638) (0.0632) (0.0487) (0.0339) (0.112)
Government -0.227** -0.218** -0.258** -0.177** -0.407**
(0.0606) (0.0601) (0.0489) (0.0461) (0.107)
Exporter 0.0411 0.0411 -0.0303 -0.0221 0.0560
(0.0458) (0.0454) (0.0356) (0.0248) (0.0812)
Foreign -0.0842 -0.0778 -0.111** -0.0752* -0.135
(0.0562) (0.0558) (0.0428) (0.0305) (0.0982)
Multi-country -0.170** -0.174** -0.101* -0.0696* -0.291**
(0.0558) (0.0554) (0.0428) (0.0295) (0.0965)
Few Compet. 0.188* 0.177* 0.236** 0.152* 0.314*
(0.0887) (0.0882) (0.0745) (0.0601) (0.156)
Many Compet. 0.399** 0.386** 0.384** 0.222** 0.686**
(0.0764) (0.0760) (0.0648) (0.0618) (0.134)
Observations 7017 7162 7018 7018 7017
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
probit model. The estimates for such a model are presented in Tables 13-15. 28 Given that
the results observed dierences in coecients across the columns in Tables 13-15, the basic
probit model was preferred for its parsimony, ease of interpretation and ease of calculation
of marginal eects.
28Estimates were produced using Williams's 2006 gologit2 command in Stata.
34Table 13: Maxium Inuence. Partial proportional odds model allowing all coecients to vary
across columns. While some coecients vary substantially, none of the results contradict our
qualitative conclusions. Dummies for sector, country, and age category included but results
not reported.
> Never > Seldom > Sometimes > Often
Medium 0.482** 0.324** 0.150 0.284
(0.0735) (0.0834) (0.111) (0.167)
Large 1.075** 0.743** 0.477** 0.610**
(0.104) (0.107) (0.141) (0.202)
Government 0.606** 0.607** 0.419** 0.395
(0.0971) (0.102) (0.142) (0.224)
Exporter 0.244** 0.209** 0.141 -0.0218
(0.0736) (0.0797) (0.108) (0.157)
Foreign 0.0141 0.0925 -0.0264 -0.300
(0.0928) (0.0969) (0.127) (0.213)
Multi-country 0.332** 0.287** 0.437** 0.494**
(0.0913) (0.0936) (0.119) (0.181)
Few Compet. -0.302* -0.268 -0.478* -0.507
(0.143) (0.151) (0.196) (0.300)
Many Compet. -0.354** -0.384** -0.563** -0.466
(0.122) (0.128) (0.165) (0.241)
Constant -1.764** -2.039** -3.246** -38.73
(0.471) (0.591) (0.919) (2103.5)
Observations 5456
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
35Table 14: Firm characteristics explaining constraint from environmental regulations: coef-
cient estimates from partial proportional odds model. Coecients were constrained to be
equal across the columns if Wald tests on unconstrained estimates failed to reject the null
of equality at 5% signicance. Null was rejected for the coecients on Large and Foreign
but none of the results contradict model predictions. Dummies for sector, country, and age
category included but results not reported.
> None > Minor > Moderate
Medium 0.219** 0.219** 0.219**
(0.0572) (0.0572) (0.0572)
Large 0.569** 0.332** 0.0600
(0.0920) (0.0895) (0.122)
Government -0.0259 -0.0259 -0.0259
(0.0777) (0.0777) (0.0777)
Exporter 0.0537 0.0537 0.0537
(0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0577)
Foreign 0.0304 -0.0681 -0.326*
(0.0834) (0.0836) (0.128)
Multi-country -0.125 -0.125 -0.125
(0.0725) (0.0725) (0.0725)
Few Compet. 0.308** 0.308** 0.308**
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Many Compet. 0.213* 0.213* 0.213*
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Constant -0.911* -2.080** -3.419**
(0.366) (0.367) (0.371)
Observations 6774
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
36Table 15: Constraint from High Taxes: coecient estimates from partial proportional odds
model. Coecients were constrained to be equal across the columns if Wald tests on uncon-
strained estimates failed to reject the null of equality at 5% signicance. Null was rejected
for the coecients on Medium, Large, Government, and Many Competitors. The coe-
cient on Large in column 3 contradicts model predictions and may indicate that Large rms
(similarly to Foreign and Multi-country rms) have accounting means to avoid major tax
obstacles. Dummies for sector, country, and age category included but results not reported.
> None > Minor > Moderate
Medium 0.190 -0.0759 0.0884
(0.104) (0.0778) (0.0659)
Large 0.339* -0.0363 -0.224*
(0.133) (0.103) (0.0919)
Government -0.699** -0.369** -0.425**
(0.128) (0.102) (0.0901)
Exporter -0.0597 -0.0597 -0.0597
(0.0616) (0.0616) (0.0616)
Foreign -0.202** -0.202** -0.202**
(0.0750) (0.0750) (0.0750)
Multi-country -0.177* -0.177* -0.177*
(0.0752) (0.0752) (0.0752)
Few Compet. 0.389** 0.389** 0.389**
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
Many Compet. 0.784** 0.722** 0.576**
(0.128) (0.114) (0.108)
Constant 2.483** 0.706 0.402
(0.686) (0.413) (0.392)
Observations 7018
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
37Table 16: Probit regressions for Maximum Inuence >\Never": Robustness Checks for
sensitivity to inclusion of additional determinants of inuence. Dummies for sector, country,
and age category included but results not reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medium 0.285** 0.285** 0.251** 0.284** 0.301**
(0.0448) (0.0565) (0.0475) (0.0481) (0.0697)
Large 0.642** 0.532** 0.550** 0.630** 0.635**
(0.0628) (0.0806) (0.0671) (0.0673) (0.116)
Government 0.346** 0.254** 0.240** 0.396** 0.243**
(0.0599) (0.0832) (0.0787) (0.0667) (0.0772)
Exporter 0.157** 0.165** 0.145** 0.140** 0.235**
(0.0451) (0.0556) (0.0473) (0.0482) (0.0720)
Foreign 0.0420 0.0925 0.0263 0.0367 -0.0118
(0.0580) (0.0687) (0.0589) (0.0619) (0.113)
Multi-country 0.182** 0.161* 0.167** 0.199** 0.265*
(0.0561) (0.0708) (0.0574) (0.0599) (0.118)
Few Compet. -0.170 -0.00823 -0.123 -0.0892 -0.0899
(0.0874) (0.117) (0.0995) (0.0950) (0.113)
Many Compet. -0.222** 0.00158 -0.145 -0.194* -0.205*
(0.0745) (0.102) (0.0859) (0.0818) (0.0925)
Constant -1.038** -1.126** -0.944** -1.262** -1.079**
(0.271) (0.302) (0.296) (0.313) (0.282)
Extra Controls None Owner. Conc. Legal Org. Corruption H.Q. in city
Observations 5456 3650 5051 4848 2512
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
38Table 17: Countries with data included in the base regression by WB Region
Region Country
Transition Europe Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep, Estonia, Geor-
gia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, Lithua-
nia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
East Asia China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore
South Asia India
Latin America Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mex-
ico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago,
Uruguay, Venezuela
OECD Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
39Table 18: By Region: Probit regressions for Maximum Inuence >\never". While there is
some regional variance in eects all results are consistent with the model except for South
Asia which is likely suering bias due to a very small sample. Average discrete eects for
change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 reported. Dummies for sector, country, and age
category included but results not reported.
Trans.Eur. E.Asia S.Asia Lat.Am. OECD
Medium 0.102** 0.102* -0.0647 0.0777* 0.124**
(0.0233) (0.0441) (0.123) (0.0304) (0.0350)
Large 0.229** 0.120* -0.0382 0.208** 0.367**
(0.0403) (0.0490) (0.146) (0.0346) (0.0436)
Government 0.0932** 0.0865 . 0.162* 0.194**
(0.0271) (0.0639) . (0.0710) (0.0609)
Exporter 0.0699** 0.0285 0.220 0.0481 0.0478
(0.0250) (0.0475) (0.117) (0.0292) (0.0375)
Foreign 0.00905 -0.0324 -0.101 0.0632 -0.0437
(0.0366) (0.0544) (0.148) (0.0334) (0.0455)
Multi-country 0.0609 0.114* 0.0475 0.0450 0.0222
(0.0387) (0.0505) (0.115) (0.0312) (0.0451)
Few Compet. -0.0271 0.102 0.679** -0.139* -0.234*
(0.0372) (0.0931) (0.0521) (0.0651) (0.0919)
Many Compet. -0.0673* 0.0503 0.335** -0.114 -0.208*
(0.0321) (0.0984) (0.0531) (0.0600) (0.0850)
Observations 2593 459 74 1517 801
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
40Table 19: By Region: Probit regressions for Environmental Regulations >\minor" obstacle.
Signicance of eects has been lowered by increasing standard errors from smaller samples.
Average discrete eects for change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 reported. Dummies for
sector, country, and age category included but results not reported.
Trans.Eur. E.Asia S.Asia Lat.Am. OECD
Medium 0.0471* 0.0411 0.0447 0.0250 0.0232
(0.0201) (0.0319) (0.0771) (0.0317) (0.0397)
Large 0.0787* 0.0501 0.0107 0.0603 0.133*
(0.0374) (0.0447) (0.0925) (0.0364) (0.0577)
Government 0.0247 -0.0213 -0.105 0.0449 -0.0256
(0.0231) (0.0666) (0.0854) (0.0705) (0.0614)
Exporter 0.0210 0.0150 -0.0252 -0.0145 -0.0324
(0.0213) (0.0328) (0.0656) (0.0287) (0.0396)
Foreign -0.00168 -0.0253 0.00433 0.0128 0.0103
(0.0325) (0.0332) (0.0758) (0.0327) (0.0483)
Multi-country -0.0424 -0.0492 -0.117 -0.0200 -0.00354
(0.0310) (0.0374) (0.0734) (0.0311) (0.0459)
Few Compet. 0.0800* -0.0461 0.320 -0.0679 0.141
(0.0375) (0.0930) (0.184) (0.0674) (0.103)
Many Compet. 0.0387 -0.139 0.325* -0.0472 0.145
(0.0273) (0.0813) (0.132) (0.0644) (0.0772)
Observations 3111 1119 273 1472 794
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
41Table 20: By Region: Probit regressions for High Taxes > \minor" obstacle. Average discrete
eects for change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 reported. Dummies for sector, country,
and age category included but results not reported.
Trans.Eur. E.Asia S.Asia Lat.Am. OECD
Medium 0.000232 -0.0105 -0.0666 -0.00236 -0.0532
(0.0148) (0.0337) (0.0710) (0.0227) (0.0348)
Large 0.0228 0.00683 0.0499 -0.00507 -0.154**
(0.0225) (0.0443) (0.0804) (0.0260) (0.0554)
Government -0.0362* -0.161* 0.00918 -0.0426 -0.114
(0.0176) (0.0758) (0.0764) (0.0560) (0.0658)
Exporter 0.0244 0.000827 -0.00782 -0.0185 0.0538
(0.0143) (0.0350) (0.0591) (0.0213) (0.0325)
Foreign -0.0178 0.0153 -0.0956 -0.0221 -0.0362
(0.0240) (0.0365) (0.0700) (0.0257) (0.0421)
Multi-country -0.0707** -0.0620 -0.00438 -0.0374 0.0159
(0.0274) (0.0433) (0.0688) (0.0246) (0.0372)
Few Compet. 0.0505** 0.109 0.0480 -0.0219 -0.00599
(0.0177) (0.0877) (0.225) (0.0509) (0.0871)
Many Compet. 0.107** 0.124 0.0668 0.0768 0.0277
(0.0234) (0.0797) (0.229) (0.0513) (0.0773)
Observations 3270 1115 289 1522 818
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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